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ABSTRACT 
The paper proposes a critical1 approach to information systems definition, 
design, and development (ISD) grounded in discourse theory, semiotics, 
practical philosophy and critical systems thinking. It aims to support IS 
researchers and practitioners in the difficult process of identifying and 
scrutinizing the diverse issues they face in any ISD project. Two main 
components of the approach are a hierarchic arrangement of these issues, and of 
the basic kinds of validity claims they imply, in the form of a philosophical 
staircase; and a practical framework for critical discourse on these claims called 
critically systemic discourse. The present first part introduces the staircase and 
discusses the relevance of the discursive principle for dealing with the various 
validity claims raised by each one of its steps. The second part will present a 
discursive framework for applying the staircase. 
                                                 
1  The word critical is unfortunately ambivalent in English. In this paper, I use it in the philosophical sense 
of “critique” or “critical reflection” (on validity claims) rather than in the engineering sense of a “critical 
factor” (of success or failure). Critique means a systematic effort of uncovering the presuppositions and 
implications of claims (e.g., in the present context, claims to providing adequate information, valid 
knowledge, or recommendations for rational action) rather than criticism in the everyday sense of taking an 
adverse attitude. Thus, the phrase “a critical approach to ISD” intends an approach that provides support for 
reflecting systematically on the claims raised by a concrete systems definition or design, and on the 
implications they may have (if accepted) for all concerned parties. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In search of clear language and 
philosophy. We tend to talk of “information” 
and “knowledge” as if we knew what they are. 
We conceive of them like of objects that we 
can store, process and retrieve in material 
form. Some three hundred years ago 
researchers in chemistry were using the 
“phlogiston” concept in a similar way to refer 
to an imaginary element that supposedly was 
lost in the process of combustion. During more 
then hundred years the phlogiston theory 
caused chemists a lot of troubles, which could 
be overcome only when Lavoisier replaced it 
by the oxidation theory of combustion. 
Perhaps information system designers are in a 
similar situation today. Perhaps it is time to 
start conceiving of information and knowledge 
(like of combustion) in terms of processes 
rather than objects; we do not “have” 
information and knowledge but “we inform” 
and “we know,” concepts that imply active 
subjects who interact and share what they 
think they know with others (Nissen 1992 and 
2001). In this paper, I want to show that in the 
development and use of information systems 
we might indeed do well to conceive of 
information and knowledge as ongoing 
judgmental and argumentative processes, and 
that in order to understand their meaning and 
validity, as well as their relevance for rational 
action, we need the discursive principle – the 
idea that the meaning, relevance, and validity 
of information and knowledge can be 
established only through discourse.  
In current practice, things look rather 
different. ISD usually attempts to objectify and 
nail down “information” and “knowledge” in 
the form of data and inference rules that can 
be stored and manipulated by computers. It is 
true, though, that the field of IT/IS moved long 
ago from its original data-processing (EDP) 
language to the language of information 
systems definition, design, and development 
(ISD). This indicates at least a progress of 
intentions, if not of actual achievement. By 
“information,” IS designers and users 
obviously mean something more than “data”; 
otherwise the change of language would be 
pointless. I assume this “more” alludes to the 
meaning and relevance that the provided data 
should have for the intended users: when 
“data” acquires context-dependent meaning 
and relevance, it becomes information. 
Furthermore, we obviously expect information 
to represent valid knowledge on which users 
can rely for rational action. Unfortunately, it is 
less obvious how exactly the steps from data to 
information and on to knowledge and rational 
action can be accomplished (or at least 
supported) by ISD. The “information” 
language of ISD seems at the same time too 
ambitious and too narrow: too ambitious in 
that technically as well as philosophically 
speaking, it is far from clear how arrangements 
for systematic data provision by means of IT – 
“information systems” – can produce 
information as distinguished from data; too 
narrow in that what we really expect a good 
information system to accomplish is to provide 
users with knowledge for rational action.  
One should certainly not overemphasize 
terminological questions. Ideas and intentions 
matter more than the labels we attach to them. 
However, inaccurate language is such a 
widespread phenomenon in ISD that it can 
hardly be accidental. Rather, I suspect, it 
betrays a certain lack of philosophical clarity 
with respect to the field’s core concepts and 
intentions.  
The idea of a philosophical staircase 
for ISD. If it is not entirely mistaken that the 
present state of the field suffers from a 
widespread lack of clarity concerning its core 
concepts, it seems vital to clarify and 
strengthen the philosophical foundations of 
ISD. My idea in this paper is to introduce what 
I suggest to call a philosophical staircase of 
ISD, that is, a series of conceptual steps that 
lead us from the prevailing, philosophically 
impoverished concept of “information theory” 
to a more adequate philosophy of ISD. The 
philosophical staircase is a conceptual 
framework that arranges basic philosophical 
issues of ISD in a flight of stairs that can be 
taken step by step, although each consecutive 
step depends on all the previous ones. There 
are nine such steps in the framework, arranged 
in three groups of three steps each. The third 
step of each group can be understood as a kind 
of half-landing on the way up the stairs where 
we can rest and reflect on what we have 
achieved so far (Figure 1). 
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  “Rational action” 
 “Knowledge”  
“Information”   
Figure 1: Three major half-landings in the philosophical staircase of ISD 
 
The underlying definition of ISD is 
this: ISD is systems definition, design, and 
development with a view to providing 
people with information for purposeful 
action. The implicit idea is that the value of 
“information” consists in contributing to 
knowledge for purposeful action, and that 
the value of “knowledge” in turn consists in 
guiding people toward rational action in the 
sense of helping actors to choose courses of 
action with reason. This basic definition is 
still unclear as the three key terms are in obvious 
need of philosophical clarification. Our 
philosophical staircase thus requires us to relate 
ISD to three basic philosophical questions: 
• What do we mean by information?  
• How does information become knowledge?  
• How does knowledge relate to rational 
action?  
(See Table 1) 
Table 1: Three core philosophical problems posed by information systems design 
Core concept Basic issue Basic theory 
“Information” The philosophical step from 
symbolic systems to 
“information” 
How do we know that some signal 
or message (a stream of signs or 
symbols) represents information? 
Semiotics: the theory of signs 
and symbols 
≠ “information theory” 
“Knowledge” The philosophical step from 
information to “knowledge” 
How do we know that some 
information represents valid and 
relevant knowledge? 
Epistemology: the theory of 
knowledge  
≠ “science theory” 
“Rational” action The philosophical step from 
knowledge to “rational” action 
How do we know that the 
knowledge we rely on is conducive 
to rational action? 
Practical philosophy: the 
theory of rational action  
≠ “applied science” 
I will discuss each core concept in 
terms of three elementary philosophical 
conditions, so that in the end our conceptual 
staircase will consist of nine conceptual steps 
that lead us from computer-processed data to 
rational action (Figure 2). 
 
The discursive principle. A second 
basic idea of the paper is that in order to take 
these conceptual steps, we need a 
methodological tool that can help us to climb 
the stairs both in the theory and in the practice 
of ISD; I mean the principle of discourse.  
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   Figure 2: The philosophical staircase of ISD 
 
A philosophical staircase for ISD: A discursive approach to reflective practice (Part 1) 
Discourse as I understand it here is not just the 
idea that people involved in ISD should “talk 
together” (of course they should); rather, it is 
an argumentative method of clarifying 
disputed validity claims such as “this is a 
meaningful interpretation of the data” or “this 
information agrees with the facts.” I propose 
that discourse in this sense is constitutive of 
what we mean by “information,” “knowledge,” 
and “rationality,” insofar as each of these 
concepts entails different types of validity 
claims that can always be disputed on good 
grounds. Note that insofar as information gets 
objectified in information systems, discourses 
get frozen in objectified form too. This is the 
exact contrary of what the discursive principle 
intends. 
Discourse can help us take the 
philosophical steps that lead from data to 
information, and then from information to 
knowledge and on to rational action, (a) by 
laying open the validity claims that underpin 
each step and (b) by subjecting these claims to 
argumentative examination by all those 
concerned. The methodological decision of 
submitting to discursive examination all the 
assumptions that lead us up the stairs is what I 
mean by the discursive principle in the context 
of ISD. The paper suggests using the 
discursive principle, along with the 
philosophical staircase, as an essential device 
not only for clarifying theoretically the validity 
claims involved in information systems 
definition, design, and development but also 
for promoting reflective ISD practice. 
Organization of the paper. In Sections 
2-4, I propose to look briefly at each of the 
three core concepts of “information,” 
“knowledge,” and “rational” action in terms of 
the philosophical issues they raise from the 
perspective of the basic disciplines or theories 
mentioned in Table 1. We will see how the 
discursive principle emerges from these 
philosophical traditions as an indispensable 
device both for understanding and for 
examining the validity claims that each 
concept implies. To avoid boring readers with 
philosophical rudiments with which most may 
be familiar, I have summarized a few 
elementary aspects of each basic theory (as 
mentioned in Table 1) in frames marked 
“Excurses.” Readers may skip or consult these 
excurses according to their needs. Even so, the 
philosophical staircase of ISD raises issues that 
reach far beyond what I can hope to achieve in 
a single paper. I thus do not claim to do justice 
to all the issues involved; rather, I try to focus 
on some aspects that I find particularly helpful 
for going up the stairs, such as the role that the 
discursive principle may play. Section 5 will 
then offer a summary interpretation of the 
implications of the staircase for ISD and will 
briefly consider the example of hospital 
information systems to illustrate the practical 
relevance of this interpretation. This will 
conclude Part 1. 
Part 2 begins with Section 6. It offers a 
review of three papers from the ISD literature 
that I find exemplary for the ways in which 
they consider the discursive principle. We will 
conclude that if the discursive principle is to 
gain more practical importance in ISD, we 
need to redefine it in terms of a “critical turn,” 
that is, an approach to reflective practice that 
focuses on dealing critically with the inevitable 
deficits of validation rather than understanding 
discourse as a means of validation of the 
claims involved in ISD. Section 7 will then 
outline a discursive framework to this end; a 
framework that should help readers in 
identifying and examining concrete issues as 
they arise in ISD practice at all levels of the 
staircase. The framework is based on my work 
on critical systems thinking – especially my 
“critical systems heuristics” (Ulrich 1983) – 
and is called critically systemic discourse, for 
reasons that I will explain. The final Section 8 
will consider a practical case and outline a 
three-stage model for the practical application 
of the framework. 
2 THE DISCURSIVE KERNEL OF 
INFORMATION 
What do we mean by “information”? 
Philosophically speaking, information science 
and technology (IT) appear to have got it 
wrong from the start. Their conceptual and 
technical tools basically deal with the 
processing and transmission of signals (or 
messages, streams of signs) rather than with 
“information.” Signals are arrangements of 
material (physical or electronic) signs that may 
carry some information but do not themselves 
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tell us what information they carry, except in 
the syntactic sense of conforming to the rules 
of a certain syntax. This is certainly no news, 
yet we continue to refer to issues of signal 
processing and transmission in terms of 
“information theory.” The language of 
information theory makes us easily forget that 
not information theory but semiotics, the 
general theory of signs and symbols, is the 
fundamental philosophical theory on which we 
should rely for understanding and defining 
“information” (Excursus 1).  
 
Excursus 1: Semiotics. “The general study of symbolic systems, including language.” 
(Blackburn 1994, p. 346) The theory goes back to work by Charles S. Peirce (1931-35) on a 
general theory of signs and symbols and was elaborated by Charles Morris (1938, 1946) as 
a general study of linguistic meaning. Both authors distinguished between three fundamental 
(because irreducible) aspects or branches of semiotics: 
Syntactics analyzes the relation of signs to other signs within a language, that is, the 
structure (syntax or grammar) of well-formed messages. The essence of good syntax is 
clarity of FORM considering given rules of coding – the “signs” constituting a message are 
understood. 
Semantics analyzes the relation of signs or messages to that which they signify, that is, their 
meaning. The essence of good semantics is clarity of CONTENT considering given contexts 
of interpretation – the “signification” of a message is understood. 
Pragmatics, finally, analyzes the relation of signs or messages to their users, that is, the way 
they are used in contexts of communication and action. The essence of good pragmatics is 
clarity of CONSEQUENCES considering given contexts of application – the “significance” of 
a message is understood. 
The relationship between these three aspects under which symbolic systems can be 
considered is asymmetric: pragmatic clarity of meaning presupposes semantic clarity and 
semantic clarity presupposes syntactic clarity, whereas syntactic clarity presupposes neither 
semantic nor pragmatic meaning. It is therefore useful to conceive of the three aspects in 
terms of semiotic levels, that is, levels of communication and (mutual) understanding. 
Information theory, due to its mathematical and statistical character, can deal with the 
syntactic level of symbolic systems only. It thus cannot supersede semiotics as a theoretical 
basis of information systems design. A similar relationship holds between IT and IS. 
Information processing machines and software can grasp meaning (and thus “understand” 
and “communicate” messages) at the syntactic level only; the semantic and pragmatic levels 
require subjective intentionality and intersubjective exchange, which are distinctive of human 
cognition and communication. For handling these aspects, information systems remain 
dependent on their human designers, operators, and users. 
 
Semiotics and Information Theory – 
two concepts of “information.” Semiotics 
includes issues of information theory but 
cannot be reduced to it (Figure 2, steps 1-3). 
As is well known, information theory 
(Shannon and Weaver 1949) defines the 
information content of a message – a stream of 
signs – by the amount of uncertainty that the 
message eliminates in a statistical sense. What 
it tells us is “Cheers, it’s me, forget about all 
the other bloody combinations of signs that 
might have arrived in my place!” The lower 
the relative frequency of that particular 
combination of signs is, given a certain stock 
of signs that can be transmitted, the higher is 
its “information content.” Who cares (in 
information theory) how poor or unimportant 
the content of the message may actually be to 
the receiver. Contrary to what we were assured 
by McLuhan (1964), the medium is perhaps 
the massage but definitely not the message.  
In semiotics, by contrast, information is 
a concept that is defined at all three levels of 
communication. By implication, information 
we give or receive is not clear unless the 
intended contexts of interpretation (semantic 
clarity) and application (pragmatic clarity) are 
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equally clear (Figure 2, steps 2 and 3). The 
first lesson, then, is that IT/IS must learn to 
live with information in the richer sense of 
semiotics; which is why the discursive 
principle comes into play already before the 
first half-landing of the staircase. 
Given that we probably have to live for 
some time with the ambivalent language of 
information processing, let us begin by saying 
what we mean when we talk of “information.” 
Let us be clear at all times about which 
semiotic levels we intend. To avoid constant 
awkward references to the semiotic levels 
concerned, as much as continuous blurring of 
philosophically distinct categories, I propose 
we indicate the intended concept of 
information by means of the two alternative 
indices “IT” (informationIT) or “ISD” 
(informationISD) whenever there might be any 
doubt at which semiotic level we are arguing. 
With reference to steps 1-3 of the staircase we 
might equally talk of information (1), 
information (2) and information (3), but the 
first solution probably has the advantage of 
being more self-explanatory. As the terms 
should make obvious, informationIT is defined 
at the syntactic level, whereas informationISD 
is sufficiently defined at the semantic and 
pragmatic levels only (each of which 
presupposes the preceding semiotic levels). 
We then gain these two concepts of 
information: 
1. InformationIT comprises everything that 
can be defined at the syntactic level, that 
is, all inputs, means, and outputs of data 
processing. “Data” in this context means 
records that can be processed (objects of 
computer processing) including the rules 
of inference and programs by which they 
are processed and the results of such 
processing, all regarded at the syntactic 
level. This is different from the everyday 
concept of “data,” which usually refers to 
circumstances regarded at all three 
semiotic levels.  
2. InformationISD, by contrast, comprises 
everything that humans do with “data” (in 
both senses of the word) at the semantic 
and pragmatic levels. These activities 
involve human capabilities such as 
consciousness and intentionality, 
abstraction and reasoning, feeling and 
intuition, doubting and questioning, 
sensitivity to changing contexts, and last 
but not least: intersubjective exchange and 
understanding. For the sake of brevity, I 
will refer to these diverse capabilities as 
“human cognition and communication”.  
I will use the two indices except when 
the intended concept of information is clear or 
I mean both concepts at once. We can now 
redefine our preliminary concept of an 
information system (as contained in our 
definition of ISD) a bit more accurately: An 
information system is any systematic 
arrangement for providing a defined group of 
people with informationISD for purposeful 
action; to the extent that the arrangement relies 
on IT, it must include provisions for 
transforming informationIT into 
informationISD.  
Since only humans are capable of 
appreciating and handling informationISD, it 
follows that a proper design ideal for 
information systems must not design human 
cognition and communication out of the 
system. This may look like a rather obvious 
statement; but the fact of the matter is that 
many IS designs imply precisely this mistaken 
design ideal – “design man out of the system” 
(fortunately, ideals rarely come true). The 
problem is, so long as we reduce semiotics to 
information theory, machines are obviously far 
more efficient than people in processing 
“information” (i.e., informationIT).  
Learning from history: the “Fitts 
list.” In the engineering and scientific 
management literature, there is a classical 
story illustrating the problem. Fitts (1951) was 
an engineer who published a seminal article on 
the question of how systems functions in 
automated systems should be allocated 
optimally between men and machines, a 
question known as the problem of human 
factor engineering. He devised an empirical 
solution that became famous as the “Fitts list.” 
The list consisted of two columns, one 
standing for “man,” the other for “machine,” 
and so contrasted the functions that humans 
empirically perform better than machines to 
those in which they are inferior to machines. 
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Fitts’ contribution was widely hailed as 
breakthrough towards a clean engineering 
solution. The only problem was, it did not 
work.  
Why? There was nothing wrong with 
Fitts’ list as far as his assignment of human 
versus machine functions to the two columns 
of the list is concerned – it was never found 
incorrect. In an insightful discussion of the 
problem, Jordan (1963, with reference to 
Birmingham and Taylor 1954) uncovered the 
flaw in Fitts’ assumption of man-machine 
comparability:  
To the extent that man becomes 
comparable to a machine we do not really 
need him any more since he can be 
replaced by a machine. (Jordan 1963, p. 
162)  
The faulty concept is that human 
performance can be measured in the same 
numerical terms as that of machines. The 
implication, of course, is that man is best when 
his part in automated systems is kept as small 
as possible. Such an approach actually begs the 
question. Instead of properly examining the 
question of how we can achieve an optimal 
interaction of man and machine – “optimal” 
for both man and machine – it looks at the 
problem in machine terms only and thereby 
ends up with a faulty alternative of man or 
machine – a classical case of suboptimization. 
In the light of our philosophical 
staircase, the diagnosis of the problem is even 
more obvious. IT/IS must overcome its 
(supposed) theoretical foundation in a one-
level conception of information. There is a 
need for redefining information science in 
terms of a much more comprehensive, multi-
level philosophy of information, of which 
semiotics forms the foundation. We may 
always try push out the boundaries of what we 
can achieve at the syntactic level; but we 
should not assume that we thereby jump from 
step 1 to step 2 of the philosophical staircase 
and somehow, miraculously, transform 
informationIT into informationISD. That 
appears to be exactly what did some of the 
most eminent founding fathers of the field 
(Newell, Shaw and Simon 1958, 1960, 1972) 
when they assured us that the heuristic 
capabilities of information processing systems 
could achieve the same results that have been 
traditionally associated with human problem-
solving capabilities. (For an earlier critique of 
their claim in the light of a multi-level 
conception of problem-solving systems, see 
Ulrich 1977.) 
Toward an adequate semiotic 
foundation of ISD. Concerning the role of 
semiotics as a foundation stone, a number of 
helpful discussions are already available. A 
few I have found helpful are Andersen (1991, 
1992), Stamper (1991, 1996), Goguen (1992), 
Mingers (1996), Ngwenyama and Lee (1997), 
Klein and Myers (1999), and Nissen (1992, 
2002). Andersen (1991, p. 465) summarizes 
the case well: “A key assumption of this 
approach is that IS should fruitfully be viewed 
as media for social interaction and not as 
models of reality.” The staircase suggest that 
this assumption is indeed necessary since 
many of the difficulties we need to face at 
higher levels are strongly related to the 
normative2 character of all interpersonal 
practice, including IS.  
                                                 
2  “Normative” is a word that is no longer well 
understood in contemporary everyday English, yet 
there is no good substitute for it. In its most general 
sense, it means as much as “implying value 
judgments.” When we assert an opinion, or a 
proposition or any other kind of validity claim that 
depends on value judgments, we usually imply 
tacitly that our value judgments are valid, that is, 
that others ought to accept them and should act 
accordingly. Insofar we give our claim a 
“normative” meaning in the somewhat stronger 
sense of the term in which it is usually employed in 
philosophy, namely, as establishing norms for 
adequate (“right”) intersubjective behavior. 
“Norms” are values that are recognized to provide 
binding criteria or standards for assessing social 
interaction or action that may affect others. In the 
present paper, I use phrases such as “normative 
content” and “normative validity” in this second, 
stronger sense of implying claims to rightness. I 
speak of normative content in the double sense of 
the normative assumptions (presuppositions) that 
underpin a claim and of the normative implications 
(live practical consequences) it may have (if 
accepted) for the different parties concerned. 
Accordingly, by “normative validity” (a claim 
raised by step 6 of our philosophical staircase of 
ISD) I mean the validity of a claim with respect to 
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The semiotic insight into the social 
interactive nature of IS is indeed fundamental 
for any effort to move beyond step 1 of the 
staircase. Somewhat amazingly, though, 
Anderson and many of his colleagues do not 
seem to take this insight as seriously as one 
might expect. Not atypically, Anderson rapidly 
narrows down the perspective he just opened 
up, by focusing on interface design from a user 
perspective rather than an observer 
perspective; consequently semiotics is seen as 
“a theoretical background for user centered 
systems design and assessment” (1991, p. 
466). This looks to me rather like a confusion 
of semiotics with hermeneutics. Hermeneutic 
(interpretive, soft systems) approaches in many 
fields, including the approaches I am familiar 
with in the fields of management science and 
systems thinking, tend to avoid issues raised 
by the normative nature of social practice; they 
focus on the subjective rather than the 
intersubjective nature of informationISD. There 
are some notable exceptions among the 
contributions to IS semiotics I have mentioned, 
though (e.g., Goguen 1992; Nissen 1992 and 
2002). Semiotic analysis as I understand it 
aims beyond hermeneutics. It treats the 
pragmatic dimension as an integral aspect of 
semiotic clarity and therefore considers the 
“practical bearings” (in Peirce’s original 
wording) of information for interactive social 
practice. Practical bearings mean that “the 
design of an information system is a natural 
occasion for power struggles,” for 
“information systems are powerful engines for 
concentrating and applying power.” (Goguen 
1992, p. 11) Adequate definition of 
information requirements for a specific system 
cannot escape this implication. I can only 
assume the reason for the frequent escape into 
a predominantly hermeneutic “user” 
perspective is that semiotics alone cannot do 
the job. However, our staircase does not 
require us to burden semiotics with the entire 
load. It is sufficient that we don’t try to build 
on faulty concepts from the start; we need not 
solve all problems of ISD within the first three 
steps.  
                                                                
both its normative presuppositions and its actual 
consequences for those affected. Compare Excursus 
3. 
Let us, then, be clear in what way a 
semiotic foundation of ISD needs to go beyond 
a mere “user” perspective. The point is that 
this perspective does not capture the full extent 
to which human cognition and communication 
(or the “human factor,” in the terms of human 
factor engineering) are constitutive of 
informationISD. We need to consider not only 
the ways people use IS but also, and more 
fundamentally, the ways in which information 
is socially defined and socially momentous. In 
any field of human activity, what passes for 
information can be a very complex and 
controversial issue and can affect the lives and 
social life-worlds of many people beyond 
those involved as system designers and users. 
Adequate design of user interfaces is certainly 
necessary but by no means sufficient to do 
justice to this sort of issue. Whose information 
is it, where does it come from (garbage in, 
garbage out)? How reliable or unreliable, 
accurate or biased, unambiguous or meaning 
different things to different people is it? What 
are those informed supposed to do with it, for 
which purposes should they rely on it and for 
which other purposes they shouldn’t? What 
consequences may be linked to not using the 
information in the way it is supposed to be 
used, not only for those who are supposed to 
“use” it but also for others who may not be 
involved in its definition and use? In short, 
what ought to pass for adequate information 
and how might it affect people?  
As an illustration we may think of the 
sophisticated hospital information systems that 
nowadays keep track of patients’ medical and 
administrative data. How systems designers, 
medical and administrative staff define and 
manage diagnosis-related and treatment data 
(informationIT) and later use it as 
informationISD (case histories, case-mix 
information, quality control, hospital 
performance indicators etc.) can affect the 
patients’ health considerably and may 
sometimes be a matter of life and death for 
those affected, apart from having considerable 
financial implications. Or take the global 
weather information systems that 
meteorologists use to produce our daily 
weather report: weather forecasts too can 
become a matter of life and death for many 
people (not only meteorologists) and in any 
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case may have important economic 
implications for many sectors of society. 
Aren’t all these questions linked to the 
semantic and pragmatic content of 
information? Semiotic clarification as I intend 
it in steps 1-3 of the staircase means that in any 
concrete ISD project, we need to explore this 
kind of questions empirically for the particular 
contexts of interpretation and application 
concerned, according to Peirce’s pragmatic 
maxim: 
Consider what effects, which might 
conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to 
have. Then, our conception of these effects 
is the whole of our conception of the 
object. (Peirce 1878, para. 402) 
Just think of the “object of our 
conception” as the information output of an IS 
to see the relevance of Peirce’s criterion of 
meaning. Note that Peirce does not ask us to 
consider what practical bearings we conceive 
the object of our conception to have for 
ourselves only. The meaning of information is 
not sufficiently defined by what it means to the 
user and how useful it is to him; rather, it 
includes all the implications it may have for all 
people concerned (cf. my discussion of the 
pragmatic maxim in Ulrich 2001, pp. 11-14). 
Of course Peirce was thinking of scientific 
practice rather than ISD practice; his primary 
concern was that empirical scientists should 
make the meaning of their propositions or 
hypotheses clear by defining them in 
observational terms that allow of experimental 
examination. But it is certainly not against the 
spirit of his concern for clear thinking if we 
interpret the pragmatic maxim as a kind of 
quality control for semiotic clarity in all fields 
of research and practice. 
Concerning ISD research practice, the 
good news is that researchers, both in the 
development of new generations of software 
(Nissen 2002) and in the design and 
implementation of specific information 
systems (Checkland and Holwell 1998), are 
now increasingly taking up semantic and 
pragmatic aspects. Checkland and Holwell’s 
soft systems approach is exemplary for the 
clarity of thinking it brings to ISD practice; 
Nissen’s reflections are equally exemplary for 
a new attention to creating value for software 
users through social and hermeneutic-dialectic 
thinking. I have no doubt that such approaches 
can equip developers better than before in 
dealing with the needs of users. I see in both 
contributions a lot of potential for involving 
other stakeholders, too, and thus for doing 
even more justice to the spirit of pragmatic 
clarification that I am advocating. The bad 
news is only that the prevailing practice of 
ISD, whether “hard” or “soft,” appears to be 
rather different. As far as it is opening up to 
softer approaches, it risks reducing semiotic 
clarification to interface design, and interface 
design to the user perspective.  
My plea is for taking Peirce’s pragmatic 
maxim seriously and hence, for striking a 
better balance between the hermeneutic 
concern about understanding the situation of 
users and an emancipatory concern for the 
situation of other stakeholders. That is what an 
appropriate semiotic foundation as I advocate 
it is all about. Of course, semiotic analysis 
alone cannot secure an adequate reconciliation, 
but at least it can draw attention to possible 
sources of failure and conflict. These can then 
at least become an issue of discourse among all 
those concerned.  
The discursive kernel of information. 
At a merely syntactic level of information 
processing, the clarity of a message can be 
tested “mono-logically” either by a lonely 
human subject or by a computer according to 
general rules of well-formedness. As soon as 
we move to the semantic and pragmatic levels, 
clarity (as well as richness of content) requires 
intersubjective sharing of context-bound 
meaning and relevance. As the questions just 
considered in connection with the pragmatic 
maxim imply, the definition of informationISD, 
like that of knowledge, is socially constructed 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966). It may 
consequently be socially more or less 
acceptable or contested. “Testing” then 
requires communicative interaction to 
negotiate common definitions of relevant 
contexts of interpretation and application.  
To avoid a possible misunderstanding, 
reaching mutual understanding on semantic 
and pragmatic meaning is basically a pre-
discursive affair; either we share a definition 
or we don’t. If we don’t, we are not either right 
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or wrong, we simply don’t share the same 
interpretive framework. Strictly speaking, 
discourse comes into play only when we look 
at the practical implications of some shared or 
contested definition of informationISD, for 
these implications entail claims that can be 
decided discursively.  
By beginning to consider such implicit 
claims as early as at the semiotic levels of the 
staircase, we sneak a look at higher levels of 
the staircase, as it were. I cannot see any 
substantial reason why we shouldn’t, as long 
as it serves a critical purpose in clarifying and 
defining what passes for information. In 
practice the two issues of sharing meanings 
and accepting claims are so closely intertwined 
that we tend to speak naturally of “claims” to 
information. I think it is symptomatic indeed 
that “mutual understanding” refers 
simultaneously to shared meaning and to 
agreement on normative implications, so much 
so that when we refer to mutual understanding 
it is rarely clear to what extent the minimal and 
to what extent the maximum interpretation are 
intended. What is clear, however, is that the 
nine conceptual steps of the staircase are 
closely interdependent, so much so that in 
practice they cannot be separated neatly from 
each other. Nor should they, as we may 
conclude from everything we have learned 
thus far.  
From a critical point of view, discursive 
testing of claims to informationISD is therefore 
always a relevant idea. When mutual 
understanding among IS designers breaks 
down, even if it is only intended in the 
minimal sense of shared and clear meanings, 
disagreement about intended practical 
implications is usually not far away. For these 
reasons I would suggest that in sound ISD 
practice, decisions on what passes for 
informationISD should always be seen as 
calling for discursive procedures, for such 
decisions represent the points where discourse 
stops (perhaps before it has begun) and 
subsequently becomes frozen into 
informationIT. No matter how distorted the 
communicative practice underpinning such 
decisions may be, they still embody frozen 
discourses and therefore, as a matter of 
principle, should be open to previous and 
subsequent discursive challenge. 
In conclusion, if information systems 
are to provide people with meaningful and 
relevant informationISD for purposeful action, 
they need to support, and to be supported by, 
adequate discursive practices. We cannot hope 
to achieve clarity and relevance of 
informationISD without giving a systematic 
place to the discursive principle from the very 
beginning.  
3 THE DISCURSIVE KERNEL OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
What do we mean by “knowledge”? 
Taking up what we have just noted, mutual 
understanding about the meaning and 
relevance of the content of some statement (its 
informationISD content) is not the same as 
validity. When we make a statement, we not 
only imply that its meaning is clear at all three 
semiotic levels (i.e., everyone concerned 
understands what we say) but also that what 
the statement states is accurate, that is, free 
from errors and omissions. With this sort of 
claim we move from the first to the second 
theoretical level in Table 1, from semiotic to 
epistemological considerations. 
Epistemological reflection and discourse begin 
when we move from shared understanding 
about what counts as information (semiotic 
clarity) to the question of what counts as 
knowledge (epistemological clarity). 
Epistemology is the philosophical discipline 
concerned with the nature, origin and 
validation of knowledge, or shortly, the theory 
of knowledge.  
It must astonish that in many scientific 
disciplines (both basic and applied sciences), 
the theories of knowledge underpinning 
theoretical propositions as well as practical 
proposals are hardly ever made explicit. 
Researchers usually write and talk as if they 
were a matter of course. This may be 
unproblematic in many natural science 
disciplines, where well-proven experimental 
methodologies make sure that false claims will 
sooner or later be discovered; in the social and 
applied disciplines, however, a lack of clarity 
as to what counts as knowledge can become a 
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serious source of deception, since in these 
fields false claims are not so easily uncovered. 
Consequently, explaining and questioning 
what counts as knowledge – reflecting on the 
assumed theory of knowledge – is never a bad 
idea. What, then, do we mean by 
“knowledge”? 
Basically, in the context of academic 
and professional work, knowledge means 
propositional knowledge that something is the 
case (as in “water is a compound of hydrogen 
and oxygen”; “there is a 75% chance that it 
will rain tomorrow”) or about how something 
can be done (as in “water can be generated 
from the combustion of hydrogen”), rather 
than non-propositional knowledge in the sense 
of mere familiarity with a thing or a person (as 
in “I know Peter”). Propositional knowledge is 
what a true proposition says is (or will, or 
may) be the case, provided the proposition can 
be substantiated by compelling reasons. That is 
to say, knowledge requires more than a belief 
or guess that is accidentally true; it requires 
justified, true, belief – the knower must be able 
to explain why he asserts that something is the 
case. If I simply guess that it will rain 
tomorrow but cannot explain why this is so, 
then I do not “know” but merely assert that it 
will rain. It is thus not sufficient for a 
knowledge claim that the proposition in 
question is confirmed by experience; if that 
were so, any guess that happens to be 
confirmed by experience would represent 
knowledge. Knowledge in the sense intended 
here depends on the possibility of making an 
argument to the truth of a proposition. A 
knowledge claim implies that the question of 
truth is rationally decidable. 
Unfortunately, there is little agreement 
in the theory of knowledge about what 
constitutes a satisfactory argument for truth. 
Epistemology is a difficult and controversial 
subject, perhaps because it is so fundamental 
to philosophy and science. Like all 
fundamental philosophical problems, this one 
does not lend itself to a complete solution. It is 
thus hardly surprising that the history of 
philosophy has produced a great number of 
different theories of knowledge. Excursus 2 
gives an overview. 
The discursive turn of epistemology. I 
would like to make three basic observations 
concerning the present state of the theory of 
knowledge.  
1. I think is fair to describe the development 
of the theory of knowledge as leading 
from two opposing, one-sided conceptions 
of knowledge as being grounded either in 
reason or in experience, toward 
increasingly sophisticated attempts at 
explaining the way in which reason and 
experience together can ground 
knowledge. It is clear today that only in 
conjunction, reason and experience can 
produce knowledge; they are but two sides 
of the coin that entitles us to claim 
knowledge. The precise nature of this 
conjunction, however, remains a matter of 
dispute in contemporary epistemology. 
2. Neither of the theories of knowledge 
proposed thus far provides inquirers with 
an operational theory of truth, that is, a 
criterion that would allow “objective” 
(unambiguous) decisions on disputed truth 
claims; hence, in the practice of research, 
truth remains a matter of dispute, too. 
3. In order to overcome the wrong alternative 
of grounding knowledge either in 
experience or in reason, all contemporary 
theories of knowledge rely on some 
discursive procedure as the means by 
which a synthesis of the two sources of 
knowledge (or of its justification) is 
accomplished. This distinguishes 
contemporary approaches fundamentally 
from Kant’s (1781) earlier synthesis, 
which still located reason in the mind of 
an abstract, individual inquirer whose 
“apperception” (reflective perception of 
sensory experience) assured some 
“correspondence” between cognition and 
reality. (For a detailed analysis and 
reconstruction of the continuing 
importance of Kant’s thinking for 
epistemology and practical philosophy 
today and especially for a critical systems 
approach to the applied disciplines, see 
Ulrich 1983, chapters 3-5). 
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Excursus 2: Epistemology. “The branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of 
knowledge. Traditionally, central issues in epistemology are the nature and derivation of 
knowledge, the scope of knowledge, and the reliability of claims to knowledge.” (Flew 1984, 
p. 109). The theory of knowledge should not be confused or equated with so-called science 
theory, a sub-discipline of the theory of knowledge that focuses on the model of empirical-
analytic science and tends to see this model as providing the only legitimate approach to 
epistemological issues. 
The nature and derivation of knowledge: Traditionally, debates between empiricists and 
rationalists focused mainly on the question of the origin and nature of knowledge (in the 
terms of contemporary science theory, the “context of discovery”). For the empiricists, there 
can be no knowledge beyond the limits of experience; for the rationalists, all experience is 
constructed by the human mind. If there is any conclusive result of these debates, it is that 
the alternative is wrongly posed; only an approach that strikes a balance can hope to provide 
a satisfactory account. 
The reliability of claims to knowledge: In contemporary philosophy, the focus has shifted to 
the question of how claims to knowledge can be validated (the so-called “context of 
justification”). This question is more immediately relevant to the crucial issue of what, in 
practice, should count as “knowledge.” The central problem is the search for a satisfactory, 
operational theory of truth. 
Theories of truth: The classical empiricist theory is the correspondence theory of truth, 
according to which true propositions must conform to what is empirically the case, or more 
accurately, to “facts” uncovered by systematic observation; its main difficulty is that 
statements of facts are themselves propositions – no kind of systematic observation 
provides a direct, objective access to the world. The classical rationalist theory is the 
coherence theory of truth, according to which (unless the world is self-contradictory) true 
propositions must conform to other true propositions; its main difficulty is that the internal 
consistency of a system of propositions does not provide any guarantee that the propositions 
are in touch with reality. 
Although the basic point of both theories appears valid, both run into fundamental problems; 
neither has managed to operationalize its criterion of truth satisfactorily. Later theories of 
truth, beginning with Kant’s (1781) Critique of Pure Reason, therefore attempt some 
synthesis of the two classical positions. The basic idea is that reason and experience not 
only depend on each other but also can control one another to make sure that either is 
limited (in Kant’s words) to “its lawful claims.” 
A major example is the pragmatic theory of truth of Peirce and James (not to be confused 
with Peirce’s pragmatic criterion of meaning), according to which a proper synthesis of 
reason and experience must prove itself by its pragmatic value in guiding human action. 
Peirce’s (1931-58) theory is astonishingly modern today in that it also postulates that truth is 
the agreement at which a community of all competent inquirers eventually arrives, if only it 
investigates the matter long and carefully enough – an idea that anticipates later 
evolutionary and discursive conceptions of knowledge. Among these, Popper’s (1959, 1963, 
1972) critical rationalism is an influential approach that has gained wide acceptance among 
natural scientists as a theory of empirical science. It suggests that theoretical propositions 
cannot be verified but can only be falsified, namely, by observational statements that 
contradict them; and that observational statements, because they are always theory-
impregnated (i.e., depend on concepts that cannot be inferred from experience), cannot 
ultimately be validated either but can only be subject to intersubjective criticism, so-called 
“critically-rational discussion.” The most contemporary example is Habermas’ (1979, 1984) 
consensus theory of truth, according to which all propositions imply a number of different 
validity claims that can be validated only through rationally motivated discourse under 
conditions of symmetric chances of argumentation by everyone concerned. 
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The discursive kernel of knowledge: 
Peirce. Peirce (1931-58) first replaced Kant’s 
lonely transcendental subject by a community 
of competent inquirers and introduced the idea 
that truth is not a matter of individual certainty 
concerning “correspondence” but rather a 
matter of possible reference, within a 
theoretically infinite community of inquirers, 
to the judgment of others. This is Peirce’s 
famous definition of truth: 
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately 
agreed to by all who investigate, is what 
we mean by truth, and the object 
represented in this opinion is the real. That 
is the way I would explain reality. (Peirce 
1878, par. 407) 
Ever since this discursive turn of 
epistemology, reason as the indispensable 
counterpart of experience needs to be 
conceived not only in terms of individual 
reflection and judgment but also in terms of 
cogent intersubjective argumentation. Inter-
subjective argumentation is what we call 
discourse. To be sure, discourse for Peirce was 
not, and still cannot be for us today, an 
alternative to empirical science; rather, it 
should be understood as a constitutive element 
of the method of science. The success of the 
scientific method demonstrates not the 
soundness of empiricism (as many people still 
seem to believe today) but rather the value of 
using discursive procedures for validating or 
challenging empirical evidence. In this sense, 
the discursive principle has become an 
indispensable cornerstone of all contemporary 
theories of knowledge. 
Among today’s discursive theories of 
knowledge, those advanced by Karl Popper 
and Jurgen Habermas stand out as particularly 
innovative and influential. I have given 
detailed critical appreciations of both 
approaches elsewhere (Ulrich 1983, Ch. 1 for 
Popper and Ch. 2 for Habermas) and thus can 
limit my discussion here to a few essential 
aspects, without any claim to doing justice to 
either work.  
Their basic idea is the same as that of 
Peirce: empirical evidence, whatever 
procedures we use to gain it, does not speak 
for itself but requires a community of 
competent inquirers to decide on what it tells 
us and how accurate some theoretical account 
of it is. The only way to decide on the 
conclusiveness of empirical evidence for 
theoretical claims is by argumentation and 
eventual consensus among all those concerned 
and qualified. Accordingly, when we speak of 
the discursive principle, we mean the 
methodological concept of validating claims to 
knowledge and rationality through inter-
subjective argumentation among all those 
concerned and qualified.  
In the present context, the discursive 
principle raises two main questions: First, what 
should be considered to be an appropriate form 
of discourse? Second, what validity claims 
need we examine discursively when we want 
to take the step from information to 
knowledge? I will first give a very short 
summary of Popper’s answer to these two 
questions. Subsequently I will describe 
Habermas’ answer in more detail as it is much 
more helpful for our purpose of analyzing the 
philosophical staircase of ISD. I invite readers 
to follow my account since (I suspect) 
Habermas’ style of writing is not particularly 
accessible to many IS professionals, while on 
the other hand less than accurate accounts are 
as common in the IT/IS literature as elsewhere. 
Contemporary models of discourse 
(1): Popper. Popper’s (1959, 1963, 1972) 
critical rationalism has become seminal 
through the way it redefined the 
epistemological problem of how science can 
justify its claims to knowledge. It shifted the 
focus from empirical verification of 
propositions to empirical and discursive 
falsification. Popper’s falsification principle 
has found wide acceptance in the empirical 
sciences, and it has important consequences 
for our understanding of the process of 
scientific research and the growth of 
theoretical knowledge. It means that 
researchers, rather than trying to avoid 
theoretical propositions that may turn out to be 
wrong, should try to formulate hypotheses that 
lend themselves to empirical falsification. On 
this depends the progress of science. The 
beauty of Popper’s approach is that it frees 
scientists from the obligation to be error-free: 
contrary to what had been assumed before 
Popper and is still popularly believed, the aim 
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of science is not to verify its propositions but 
rather to falsify them!  
Unfortunately, however, Popper’s 
discursive falsification procedure relies on a 
rather impoverished model of discourse. Its 
criterion of successful falsification attempts 
consists in logical contradiction between the 
theoretical proposition at issue and some 
observational statement that has been accepted 
by a community of inquirers. As Popper likes 
to say, deductive logic is the “organon of 
critique.” Such a criterion of criticism cannot 
deal with the normative implications that the 
acceptance of a proposition may have in a 
context in which a decision, recommendation, 
or action is based on it. I suspect this is a major 
reason why Popper tends to ignore such issues 
or else to equate practical with merely 
instrumental reason (on the concepts of 
instrumental and practical reason, see Section 
4 of this paper).  
Contemporary models of discourse 
(2): Habermas’ “formal pragmatics.” 
Habermas’ (1984) Theory of Communicative 
Action offers the most elaborate model of 
discourse available today. For this reason it has 
gained ever-increasing recognition and 
importance in recent years, especially in the 
applied and social sciences. As the name 
suggests, Habermas’ theory introduces another 
far-reaching shift of focus, from the theory of 
knowledge to a theory of “communicative 
action,” by which he means action oriented to 
reaching mutual understanding. This makes it 
relevant to our philosophical staircase: it 
promises to take us upstairs from knowledge to 
rational action. Accordingly, we will draw on 
the theory also in the next section, where it 
will help us to clarify the meaning of rational 
action. In the present context, the theory of 
communicative action matters to us for a 
different reason: its underlying “formal 
pragmatics” (also called “universal 
pragmatics,” see Habermas 1979, 1984) can 
help us to understand the validity claims 
involved in the conceptual step from 
information (semiotic analysis) to knowledge 
(epistemological analysis).  
By formal pragmatics, Habermas 
(1984, p. 139 and p. 277) understands the 
reconstruction of universal conditions of 
successful communicative action in terms of a 
“pragmatics of language,” that is, a theory of 
speech acts that starts from the pragmatic level 
of language analysis in semiotics. A speech 
act, according to Austin (1962) and Searle 
(1969), is an utterance (an elementary unit of 
communication by means of language) that 
expresses a statement, a question, a command, 
and so on. Habermas calls his analysis of the 
pragmatic level of speech formal to distinguish 
it from the original pragmatic approach of 
Peirce (1878, 1931-35) and Morris (1938, 
1946), which aims at an empirical analysis of 
particular contexts of communication.  
Like other earlier approaches to 
analyzing communication (e.g., in information 
theory, analytical and linguistic philosophy), 
formal pragmatics aims to uncover general 
conditions of successful communication rather 
than context-bound characteristics of 
particular speech situations and related 
particular competences of individual speakers; 
in this sense too it is “formal” or, as Habermas 
originally said, “universal.” Unlike these 
earlier approaches, including semiotics, formal 
pragmatics does not assume that such formal 
analysis is possible only in respect to the 
syntactic and to some extent also the semantic 
dimensions whereas the pragmatic dimension 
is accessible to empirical analysis only (e.g. 
psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics). 
Instead, it understands the pragmatic 
dimension as an integral dimension of the 
logic of speech acts. In this double sense it 
represents a “formal pragmatics” of speech 
acts. This makes it understandable why 
Habermas (1979, pp. 26-29) also calls his 
approach a theory of communicative 
competence, in contrast to Chomsky’s (1957, 
1965) earlier theory of linguistic competence 
which focused on the phonetic, syntactic and 
semantic properties of language while leaving 
the pragmatic dimension to an empirical theory 
of linguistic performance.  
Let us now look at the general 
structures of communicative competence that 
Habermas’ analysis reveals. Communicative 
competence for Habermas is “the ability of a 
speaker oriented to mutual understanding to 
embed a well-formed sentence in relations to 
reality” (Habermas 1979, p. 29). Three such 
relations are crucial in Habermas’ (1979, pp. 
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53-68; 1984, pp. 288-295 and 307-309) 
analysis:  
1. Speech acts state something about external 
reality, that is, “the” world of objects and 
circumstances that we may perceive and 
describe in a more or less objective 
attitude – the constative function of 
speech acts. Austin (1962) speaks of 
locutionary acts; they state the 
propositional (locutionary) content of a 
sentence. 
2. Speech acts state something about social 
or interpersonal reality, that is, “our” 
social life-world of shared norms and 
conventions that regulate interpersonal 
behavior (in particular the relation 
between speaker and hearer) and to which 
both speaker and hearer may more or less 
conform – the regulative function of 
speech acts. Austin (1962) speaks of 
illocutionary acts; they express the 
intended “mode” of a sentence as an 
assertion, promise, command, avowal, 
disapproval, and so on. 
3. Speech acts express something about the 
speaker’s internal reality, that is, “my” 
subjective world of wishes, feelings, 
intentions, and so on, which a speech act 
may make more or less transparent – the 
expressive function of speech acts. This is 
related to what Austin (1962) calls 
perlocutionary acts, that is, the speaker’s 
attempt to produce certain effects upon the 
feelings, thoughts or actions of the hearer; 
but Habermas’ analysis does not follow 
Austin in this respect. He agrees with 
Austin that perlocutionary acts cannot be 
identified through the manifest constative 
and regulative functions of speech but 
only through an attempt to understand the 
speaker’s true intention (for instance, a 
command can be expressed in the form of 
a polite request or question). In distinction 
to locutionary and illocutionary aims, 
perlocutionary aims may be pursued 
without making them known to the hearer; 
a speaker can use them strategically so as 
to leave others unclear or even deceive 
them about her or his true motive. 
Habermas (1984, p. 293f) therefore 
considers this possible function of speech 
acts as a form of non-communicative 
teleological action rather than of 
communicative action. Consequently, he 
restricts his analysis of the constitutive 
conditions of successful communication to 
the locutionary (propositional) and 
illocutionary (intersubjective) components 
of speech acts, whereby the illocutionary 
component includes both the regulative 
and the expressive functions: “What we 
mean by reaching understanding has to be 
clarified solely in connection with 
illocutionary acts.” (1984, p. 293) The 
expressive function thus stands only for 
what a speaker manifests about herself 
with an orientation to reaching mutual 
understanding. 
The three functions of speech acts are 
effective simultaneously in every speech act 
that aims at mutual understanding. Thus the 
propositional content of a speech act always 
goes along with its illocutionary force (Austin 
1962, p. 99 and p. 147; Habermas 1979, p. 34), 
that is, its capacity to move the listener to enter 
into a communicative relationship and to 
recognize the speaker’s intention as sincere: 
“To be understood in a given situation, every 
utterance must, at least implicitly, establish 
and bring to expression a certain relation 
between the speaker and his counterpart. We 
can also say that the illocutionary force of a 
speech action consists in fixing the 
communicative function of the content 
uttered.” (Habermas 1979, p. 34).  
The propositional and the illocutionary 
(relationship-establishing) components of a 
speech act form a characteristic double 
structure of speech (Habermas 1979, p. 41); 
although we may give more importance to one 
of them and can vary them separately, the 
pragmatic meaning and validity of a speech act 
always depend on both components. For 
instance, when I say to my partner, “Charles is 
driving,” the same propositional content of 
Charles’ driving may intend an assertion, a 
suggestion, a command, a promise, a warning, 
or an expression of disapproval. By making 
such a statement, I claim not only that its 
propositional content is or will be true 
(Charles is or will indeed be driving) but also 
that I am right to assert, suggest, promise, 
warn, or disapprove, in the sense that my 
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intention is both sincere and legitimate and 
hence, that the hearer ought to act accordingly.  
It follows that every speech act aimed 
at mutual understanding simultaneously 
embodies validity claims regarding its 
constative as well as its regulative and 
expressive functions, no matter which one is of 
primary importance to the speaker. Apart from 
the implicit presupposition of 
comprehensibility (semiotic clarity), every 
speech act claims (1) the truth of its 
propositional content, (2) the rightness 
(appropriateness, legitimacy) of its regulative 
content, and (3) the truthfulness (sincerity, 
authenticity) of the speaker. This is for 
Habermas the universal validity basis that 
underpins all successful communication. 
Let us now return to our philosophical 
staircase (Figure 2). In what order should we 
incorporate these validity claims? Since the 
three claims are raised simultaneously and are 
interdependent, the answer is to some extent 
arbitrary. However, as in the case of the 
preceding semiotic steps, I would argue that 
the relationship between them is in a sense 
asymmetric. Without some mutual recognition 
of sincerity, communication is bound to fail 
from the beginning, before its propositional 
and regulative functions become fully 
effective. The expressive function and hence, 
the speaker’s claim to truthfulness, is thus 
basic; I therefore locate it at step 4 of the 
staircase. Next, given that our point of 
departure was the question of what constitutes 
propositional knowledge, the constative 
function and hence, the claim to truth, seems 
essential; I locate it at step 5. Finally, the 
philosophical staircase is to help us reflect on 
what it means for an IS to provide relevant 
information and valid knowledge for 
purposeful action. It makes sense to locate the 
regulative function of speech and hence, the 
claim to rightness, at the highest of the three 
epistemological levels, step 6, which can then 
lead us on to the subsequent steps concerned 
with rational action. Before raising claims to 
rationality, it is necessary to identify and 
examine the normative implications that 
knowledge – the propositional content in 
question, provided we accept it as true – may 
have in a context of application.  
In Figure 2, I therefore locate the three 
validity claims in this order. Deviating slightly 
from the original terminology of Habermas 
that I have used thus far, I will refer to the 
three validity claims as claims to expressive, 
empirical, and normative validity, respectively; 
this conforms to my earlier terminology in 
Critical Heuristics, where I referred to the 
three components of speech acts and 
knowledge claims as regarding their 
expressive, empirical, and normative content3 
(Ulrich 1983, e.g. p. 135, p. 138).  
Finally, a note for those readers who for 
whatever reasons may prefer not to base their 
practice of critical reflection on Habermas. 
Once we have identified the three types of 
claims, the reader may also relate them at least 
approximately to the general definition of 
knowledge from which we started: knowledge 
is justified (step 6), true (step 5), belief (step 
4). Adopting the staircase as a guide for 
reflective practice thus need not mean to 
subscribe to a Habermasian critical theory or 
even to a Marxist concept of criticism, with 
which Habermas is still frequently (although 
mistakenly) associated. 
From communication to discourse. In 
everyday communication, the validity basis of 
speech is often treated as unproblematic. The 
purpose consists in exchanging information 
rather than in examining validity claims. None 
of the three validity claims is then made an 
explicit subject of discussion. It is sufficient 
for the partners to assume (or anticipate, as 
Habermas likes to say) that speakers are 
prepared to substantiate their claims if asked to 
do so, and that it is at all times possible for the 
participants to switch to a different mode of 
communication in which one or several 
validity claims are actually tested. Only when 
validity claims do indeed become problematic, 
as one of the participants feels compelled to 
dispute either the speaker’s sincerity or the 
empirical and/or normative content of his 
statements, ordinary communication breaks 
down and discourse begins. This is where the 
discursive principle, once again, comes into 
                                                 
3  Compare note 2 for the meaning of “normative 
content.” 
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play in our staircase; it provides the 
methodological basis for challenging and 
defending argumentatively the validity claims 
underpinning ordinary communication. 
How this is possible is the central 
concern of Habermas’ widely known model of 
rational discourse. Since the model is well 
known, I can be brief; the reader can find a 
detailed introduction elsewhere (Ulrich 1983, 
pp. 116-151, esp. pp. 137-141). Rational 
discourse is argumentative examination of 
validity claims under conditions that preclude 
systematic distortion as it may result, for 
instance, from unequal status, access to 
information, skills and power of the 
participants. Accordingly, consensus reached 
in discourse is “rational” (i.e., rationally 
justified rather than merely factual) to the 
extent it approximates an “ideal speech 
situation.” This is a discourse situation that (a) 
would allow all those concerned to participate, 
and (b) would ensure to all participants 
symmetric chances of argumentation, a 
requirement that includes the idea of 
symmetric communicative competences. 
Discourse that examines claims to empirical 
validity is called theoretical discourse; 
discourse that examines claims to normative 
validity is called practical discourse, a concept 
that should not be confused with discursive 
practice. Expressive validity can equally be 
challenged and defended argumentatively; but 
ultimately, a speaker can substantiate the 
sincerity of his intentions only through 
consistent behavior. Strictly speaking, there is 
thus no model of rational discourse on claims 
to expressive validity, although they can 
become thematic in all communication. But let 
us not forget that every speech act implies 
simultaneous claims to truth, rightness and 
truthfulness; in discursive practice the different 
kinds of claims and corresponding forms of 
discourses cannot be separated as neatly as in 
theory. Although the emphasis will usually be 
on one type of validity claim at a time, we 
should understand theoretical and practical 
discourses as ideal types that in practice hardly 
exist in pure form.  
The structure of cogent 
argumentation: Toulmin. Once ordinary 
communication has turned into discourse, the 
question remains: what is valid 
argumentation? What constitutes a “strong” 
(cogent) as distinguished from a “weak” 
(questionable) argument? In order to explain 
the precise structure of cogent argumentation, 
Habermas relies on Toulmin’s (1964) analysis 
of The Uses of Argument. It explains the 
structure of a valid argument in terms of the 
kinds of speech acts that must follow each 
other (Figure 3): A contested conclusion 
(claim C) can first be explained by referring to 
facts and norms that provide some evidence 
for the truth and rightness of the claims 
involved (data D). (In the case of controversial 
claims to truthfulness, the speaker will be 
expected to be able to refer to credible motives 
consistent with previous behavior.) Obviously 
such evidence may in turn be disputed, or its 
relevance for the conclusion in question may 
be doubted. The speaker then needs to be able 
first, to explain the underlying theoretical 
propositions or evaluative standards (e.g. 
moral principles) that warrant the inference 
from the evidence D to the conclusion C 
(warrant W); and second, to provide further 
evidence for the claimed facts or norms by 
referring to specific observations or needs and 
values in their support (backing B). 
  D  C 
 W  
    
 B  
Figure 3: The structure of argument 
according to Toulmin 
This structure resembles the well-
known Hempel/ Oppenheim (1948) scheme of 
explanation, where C = explanandum, D = 
initial conditions (in classical logic called the 
minor premise), W = law or nomological 
hypothesis (major premise), and B = the 
empirical basis for W (basic observational 
statements); W and D together are also called 
the explanans. However, the Hempel/ 
Oppenheim scheme is conceived in terms of 
deductive logic and therefore remains at a 
syntactic level of speech; there is no place for 
pragmatic considerations (“How does it matter 
to me?”) regarding the propositional, 
normative and expressive content of the claims 
in question. This is different in Toulmin and 
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Habermas’ scheme; it captures the pragmatic 
level of speech. Speaking at a merely syntactic 
level of speech, an argument is conclusive if C 
follows logically from D in connection with W 
(which in turn needs to be consistent with B). 
Moving to the pragmatic level, an argument is 
cogent not if it is logically conclusive 
(necessary) but if it is logically possible (that 
is, the facts and norms it asserts are not in 
contradiction with W and B) and if the 
discourse participants can be motivated, by 
virtue of the backings, to recognize it as valid 
(cf. Ulrich 1983, pp. 137ff, and 1988, p. 143).  
This pragmatic concept of 
argumentative force does not reduce 
argumentation to deductive logic but allows 
the participants to consider the ways an 
argument may concern them with regard to its 
normative and expressive as well as its 
propositional content; they can require the 
proponent to provide good grounds (credible 
“evidence,” compelling “reasons”) for all these 
validity claims involved. This is why I said 
earlier that Habermas’ model of discourse is 
much richer than Popper’s model, which we 
can now characterize as relying on the 
Hempel/ Oppenheim scheme.  
Unfortunately, despite its theoretical 
richness, Habermas’ model of rational 
discourse shares with Popper’s model, as well 
as with all other available approaches to the 
theory of knowledge, the lack of an operational 
criterion and procedure for discursively 
establishing truth or other validity claims in 
practice. (I emphasize discursively because an 
operational rule in the usual non-discursive 
sense of the term would of course be against 
the spirit of the discursive approach). I would 
like to limit my discussion here to three points 
(for a detailed analysis, see Ulrich 1983, pp. 
152-172): 
1. The insight that entering into a discourse 
implies the anticipation of an ideal speech 
situation does little to make the 
anticipated situation real. Habermas’ 
theoretical point is that the ideal speech 
situation is operatively effective even 
where it is completely counterfactual. 
Practically speaking, however, the 
implication is that every consensus 
reached in discursive practice is to be 
regarded as merely factual; anything else 
would mean to claim the ideal is real. On 
this basis we cannot hope to establish any 
validity claims. This is why Habermas’ 
model cannot supply any operational 
criterion for truth or rightness, not 
anymore than all the previous theories of 
knowledge. As insightful as I find 
Habermas’ analysis as a theoretical model 
of discourse, we should not misunderstand 
it (as many commentators do) as a model 
for discursive practice. It can give us some 
guidance for reflecting on the 
shortcomings of actual discourse 
situations and for improving them, but it 
cannot secure rationality. Mistaken for a 
prescriptive model, it cannot help but 
presuppose what it is meant to achieve, 
namely, a discourse situation 
characterized by a general symmetry of 
discursive chances.  
2. Even if we assume that under fortunate 
conditions, the ideal of discursive 
symmetry can be sufficiently 
approximated to give credibility to 
resulting consensus, the underlying 
consensus theory of truth still limits the 
model’s range of application severely. In 
real-world discursive practice, consensus 
is a scarce resource. After all, discourse is 
required when validity claims are 
controversial! In a world of seemingly 
ever-increasing pluralism of values and 
worldviews, it appears counterproductive 
to tie the concept of rationality so 
exclusively to ideally rational consensus 
as Habermas attempts this. If we really 
wish to promote rational practice, I do not 
think we should limit our concept of 
mutual understanding to this kind of 
consensus; can we not at least try to reach 
mutual understanding on the reasons for 
our differences, and thus to appreciate 
genuine conflicts of values, needs and 
worldviews in a way that allows for 
reasonable cooperation?   
3. Finally, there is a third fundamental 
barrier to complete rationality, one that I 
find almost totally absent in the huge body 
of literature surrounding Habermas’ 
theory; I mean the problem of boundary 
judgments (Ulrich 1983). In the practice 
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of discourse, even the most completely 
rational argumentation needs to begin with 
some premises that it cannot justify any 
further and needs to end with some 
conclusions that it cannot explore any 
further. Every chain of argumentation 
begins and ends with boundary judgments, 
that is, judgments that define the points at 
which rational justification stops and 
which consequently delimit the range of 
application of the validity claims in 
question. As I will argue in Section 7, this 
problem is of great practical relevance for 
developing a reflective approach to 
discursive practice: it opens up a path for 
dealing rationally with everyday 
conditions of incomplete rationality. 
The problem of boundary judgments 
provides the starting point for my work on 
critical systems heuristics, and in particular for 
its attempt to pragmatize the ideal speech 
situation so that in everyday discourses we can 
begin to deal critically with the inevitable lack 
of complete rationality. I will introduce this 
approach in Section 7 of the present paper.  
Our conclusion, once again, is clear: 
Knowledge is fundamentally discursive, at 
least in the critical sense that claims to 
knowledge must always remain open to 
argumentative challenge.  
ISD’s loss of epistemological 
innocence: toward a critical turn. The 
development of the theory of knowledge as we 
have traced it from Kant to Habermas is 
certainly somewhat ambivalent. The more we 
understand what it means to claim knowledge 
– and I believe we do understand more today 
than 100 or 200 years ago – the more we are 
compelled to be careful about such claims. 
Whether we like it or not, the present state of 
the theory of knowledge has relativistic 
implications for ISD. The least we can do in 
this situation is to make ourselves and 
everyone concerned aware of the theory of 
truth on which we rely for our claims, and to 
be open to the possibility that other people rely 
on different theories. What we have noted 
before with respect to the coming semiotic turn 
of ISD applies to its coming loss of 
epistemological innocence as well: it is not a 
good idea to rely on faulty conceptual 
foundations just for the sake of avoiding 
difficult but fundamental issues. It is certainly 
better to face these difficulties, even though 
they may have some relativistic implications.  
I am not advocating a fashionable 
epistemological relativism, though. 
Recognizing that epistemological relativism is 
normal need not mean elevating it to a norm. 
Normatively speaking, the point of 
epistemological relativism for ISD is a critical 
rather than a skeptical one: we cannot avoid 
claims to knowledge, but we can learn to do 
better when it comes to handling such claims 
in an open and self-critical way. Such a critical 
turn4 of our epistemological approach offers 
                                                 
4  The idea of a “critical turn” is a key concept of 
my understanding of reflective practice in 
systems design, and in applied science in 
general. Basically, claims to truth, normative 
rightness, and rationality imply that we consider 
all possible evidence and arguments in favor or 
against what is claimed. This conventional ideal 
of sufficient justification has clearly holistic 
implications – the basic point of “systems 
thinking.” In practice, however, the quest for 
comprehensiveness is a difficult undertaking. 
Claims to comprehensiveness, and hence to 
sufficient justification, usually beg the question 
of how under normal conditions of imperfect 
rationality we can be arguably rational. Particular 
standpoints and perspectives unavoidably 
condition all our thinking and knowledge. The 
question is not whether our knowledge and 
arguments are comprehensive but rather, how we 
deal with the fact that they never are. From a 
self-reflective standpoint, we should never 
assume comprehensiveness but instead make a 
sustained effort to uncover the conditioned 
nature of our claims. Thus, we will regard some 
practice of systems design and applied science as 
“rational” only to the extent it lays open to 
everyone concerned its inevitable selectivity with 
respect to the facts and values it considers, as 
well as the practical consequences that this 
selectivity may have. This is what I mean by a 
“critical turn” of our thinking on applied science, 
systems design, and rational practice. For a 
detailed elaboration of the concept, see Ulrich 
1983; short discussions of various aspects of the 
critical turn can also be found in Ulrich 1987, 
1993, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2002a,b and c. In the 
present paper, I will take up the implications of 
the critical turn in Part 2 (Section 7). 
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not only philosophical but also practical 
advantages. It takes from the shoulders of IS 
designers the burden of ensuring “true 
knowledge”; it frees the profession from the 
false and hopeless presumption that 
information systems can and should provide 
information which by itself can justify claims 
to knowledge, regardless of changing contexts 
and independent of institutionalized discursive 
procedures. It also gives us a new design ideal 
for information system that I find challenging 
indeed: rather than aiming to establish 
knowledge claims, a proper IS design ideal 
will incorporate some arrangements that 
promote discursive processes of critique 
regarding the information it provides; critique, 
that is, with respect to its meaning, relevance, 
and validity, or in one word, its claims to 
represent knowledge.  
Designing for sufficient critique rather 
than for sufficient justification: could that be a 
meaningful design ideal for ISD? I doubt 
whether anyone has the answer today, but I 
certainly think this kind of design ideal is 
worth trying. In this alternative ideal, a good 
information system will systematically 
promote critique and hence, lay open the ways 
in which any piece of information provided 
could be criticized and could be used for 
substantiating alternative claims to knowledge. 
We might say the idea is to internalize 
critique, out of the recognition that critique is 
the only possible (though imperfect) guarantor 
of knowledge. Based on the preceding account 
of the Toulmin-Habermas model of 
argumentation, two starting points for 
internalizing critique offer themselves: 
1. Internal warrant disclosing and 
questioning: A good information system 
will make explicit the “frozen” 
argumentative structure behind its 
informationIT. That is, it will not offer 
“information” without at the same time 
disclosing the evidence (D) and the 
warrant (W) as well as corresponding 
backings (B) that together support its 
claim to informing the user adequately 
(C). A very good system might also invite 
users to examine the claim, e.g. by 
proposing counter-evidence (D’) or 
alternative warrants (W’, B’) or by 
suggesting questions that might help users 
in assessing the validity claims involved 
in applying the information to a specific 
context of application. It might even 
suggest complete rebuttals (e.g. in the 
form of alternative claims C’ inferred 
from various combinations of D’ and W’) 
and invite users to examine these counter-
claims in respect of their relevance to the 
specific context at hand. Thus the system 
could support users in their task of 
transforming informationIT into 
informationISD, to avoid what is now 
common practice, namely, that users are 
led to take the argumentative structures 
built into the system for granted. As 
Nissen (1989, p. 107) notes, today’s 
possibilities of designing interactive user 
interfaces offer a computer-supported 
approach to allowing users to be 
responsible. 
2. External critical discourse: A good 
information system will motivate users not 
only to examine the built-in argumentative 
structure but also to submit their 
assessment of it, as well as the resulting 
interpretation and use of informationIT, to 
the scrutiny of all those concerned. That 
is, it will not offer informationIT as if it 
represented informationISD but rather will 
cause users to take the step from 
informationIT to informationISD 
consciously, by suggesting some 
discursive settings that might be useful for 
taking the step and possibly for improving 
the argumentation basis. A very good 
system might even invite users to assess 
the extent to which alternative discourse 
settings might better approximate an ideal 
speech situation, for instance by 
suggesting a checklist of stakeholder 
groups that might need to be involved, or 
by suggesting alternative sources of 
expertise that the system itself has not 
considered in its argumentative structure. 
Again, interactive user interfaces might 
invite users to feed back results of 
context-related discursive examinations to 
the system and then offer them adapted 
information in the form of further 
evidence/ counter-evidence, warrants/ 
counter-warrants, etc.  
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These are merely a few preliminary 
suggestions for a critical turn inspired by a 
careful reading of contemporary discursive 
theories of knowledge. A more substantial 
outline of the critical turn must await the 
announced explication of the problem of 
boundary judgments. 
4 THE DISCURSIVE KERNEL OF 
RATIONAL ACTION 
What do we mean by “rational” 
action? Since information systems are to 
provide people with informationISD for 
purposeful action, it astonishes that ISD 
theorists have hardly attempted to ground the 
field in practical philosophy, the branch of 
philosophy concerned with the nature of 
rational action. If a conceptual framework of 
ISD is to do justice to the pragmatic dimension 
of information (step 3 of our philosophical 
staircase) as well as to the normative 
dimension of knowledge (step 6), it certainly 
needs to relate its concepts of pragmatic clarity 
of information and normative validity of 
knowledge to a conforming concept of rational 
action. The point is that clear information and 
valid knowledge alone cannot secure rational 
practice; only proper standards of rational 
action can. Practical philosophy is concerned 
with this sort of issue (Excursus 3). 
In practical philosophy, an activity is 
usually called an action when it involves a 
degree of human freedom of the will and 
consequently implies the agent’s responsibility 
for the possible consequences. The practical in 
philosophy is what relates to action, in 
particular to this ethical core, as distinguished 
from the theoretical, which relates to thought 
and knowledge about what is empirically the 
case. Of course action also implies purposeful 
choice with respect to other aspects, not just 
ethical ones; they may concern, for instance, 
economic, ecological, and political aspects. 
But the core issue of interest to practical 
philosophy is the common normative content 
of such choices as it manifests itself both in the 
value judgments on which the choices rely and 
in the actual consequences they may have for 
people concerned. With respect to this 
normative content, action can be more or less 
reasonable for different parties concerned, that 
is, its normative rationality can be contested as 
much as its efficacy. Acceptability to all 
parties concerned is the basic intent of 
practical reason. Although the core of 
practical reason relates to the ethical 
justification of action, concerns of economic 
efficiency, ecological sustainability, political 
legitimacy, and so on, will equally matter. 
Practical reason cannot ignore these concerns 
but will seek to integrate them with ethical 
concerns. In this comprehensive sense, 
practical reason is concerned with the intrinsic 
value and interpersonal “rightness” 
(appropriateness, desirability, legitimacy) of 
actions, in distinction to merely instrumental 
reason or means-end rationality, which is only 
concerned with the value (success, utility) of 
an action for those who benefit. 
We can thus say that practical 
philosophy is the philosophical discipline 
concerned with the problem of practical 
reason: How can we identify and justify the 
intrinsic value and rightness of actions? 
Obviously, we are once again dealing with a 
philosophical ideal. Although we cannot hope 
to achieve it completely, it makes an important 
practical difference to the common notion of 
rational practice. This common notion relies 
for its validation on epistemology. Except in 
the case of Habermas’ theory of knowledge, 
which naturally leads on to the practical-
philosophical steps of the staircase, this notion 
gets stuck at step 5 of our staircase. Rational 
action is inadequately identified with action 
based on justified claims to knowledge; 
insofar, and only insofar, an actor is expected 
to justify his choices rationally. This is 
different as soon as we move to the practical 
philosophical level (steps 7-9). Rational 
practice, and accordingly the theory of rational 
action, now gains another dimension of 
rationalization, the dimension of practical 
reason. In this second dimension, claims to 
rational action oblige actors to make a credible 
argument to the interpersonal rightness of their 
actions, that is, to defend their underpinning 
concepts (or standards) of rationality.  Whose 
rationality is it? What notion of improvement 
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Excursus 3: Practical philosophy. The branch of philosophy concerned with the problem 
of rational action. The central issue is how we can rationally determine and justify the 
normative content of human action, that is, its underpinning normative principles and 
implications. Normative principles (or simply norms) are standards or rules that regulate 
human interaction in social contexts, from communication (linguistic norms, norms of 
etiquette) to legal (law) and moral norms (proper conduct); normative implications are the 
norms that are contained, whether intentionally or not, in the consequences of specific 
actions in that they are needed to justify these consequences. In the philosophical tradition 
since Aristotle, the use of human reason for analyzing norms of action is called the ‘practical’ 
use of reason, or simply practical reasoning. The ideal of practical reasoning is practical 
reason, that is, rationality of action as judged not only by instrumental success (an action 
achieves what it is meant to achieve) but also by the ethical acceptability of its normative 
content to all those effectively or potentially affected. Practical philosophy can therefore also 
be defined as “the philosophical effort to come to grips with the problem of practical reason.” 
(Ulrich 1983, p. 26, and 1988, p. 140) 
Like all fundamental philosophical problems, the problem of practical reason – of how we 
can secure rational action in the sense of practical reason – does not admit of an easy 
solution. A major core problem consists in the question of what rational justification means 
when the needs, interests, and worldviews of the people concerned by an action conflict. 
Basically we can distinguish two possible approaches to this issue, substantive (or 
normative) ethics and formal (or procedural) ethics. Substantive ethics seeks to formulate 
norms of action that can guide action in such a way that a rational choice between conflicting 
positions becomes possible. Major examples are Aristotle’s ethics of “virtue,” Kant’s (1786, 
1788) ethics of “duty,” Bentham’s (1789) ethics of “utility” (utilitarianism), M. Weber’s (1991) 
ethics of “responsibility,” A. Schweitzer’s ethics of “respect,” and Rawls’ (1971) ethics of 
“fairness” (distributive justice); domain-specific codes of professional conduct in medicine, 
legal practice, consulting and so on also fall under this approach. Formal ethics, in contrast, 
formulate procedures by means of which agents themselves can identify proper norms of 
action. Among these we can distinguish non-discursive (monological) approaches such as 
Kant’s “categorical imperative” or Bentham’s “hedonic calculus” (cost-benefit analysis), and 
discursive (dialogical) approaches such as the “Socratic method” of dialogical examination of 
actions or Apel (1980) and Habermas’ (1990) “discourse ethics.” 
In modern pluralistic societies, substantive approaches increasingly lose applicability and 
credibility, for they presuppose some societal consensus about fundamental values, 
regardless whether we conceive of these values as “virtues,” “utility,” “distributive justice,” 
and so on. The procedural approach seems more credible but of course runs into its own 
difficulties, particularly with respect to who should be regarded as “competent” (entitled) to 
apply the procedure. The distinction between “monological” and “dialogical” approaches 
appears relevant in this respect; monological approaches impose the burden of moral 
judgment on the individual agent or the group of those involved, dialogical approaches on all 
those concerned regardless of whether they are involved. The Toulmin-Habermas model of 
discourse offers itself as the most promising procedural approach available at present; 
however, its application requires a previous clarification of the standards of “rational” action 
that should be used. Obviously, practical-philosophical considerations will need to inform an 
adequate framework for a discursive validation or critique of claims to rational action. 
Conceiving of rational practice in terms of “applied science” does not represent a sufficient 
answer to the problem of rational action. 
 
does it imply? What are its actual 
consequences for all those concerned? Can 
they be moved to agree of their own free will? 
Rational practice thus becomes a two-
dimensional concept that requires both 
theoretical-instrumental reason (justified 
knowledge and its successful transformation 
into effective and efficient action) and 
practical reason (justified normative 
implications for those involved and affected, a 
core concept of critical heuristics, Ulrich 
1983).  
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Practical reason: a “strong” concept 
of rationality. It becomes then clear what is 
wrong with the commonplace notion that 
rational practice can be secured by means of 
applied science and expertise: the underlying 
concept of rationality is one-dimensional and 
thus is blind to the “other,” practical dimension 
of reason. Although it is true that in many 
situations rational practice cannot be secured 
without applied science, it is equally true that 
rational practice cannot be secured by means of 
applied science. Insofar they represent 
complementary concepts of rationality. But 
practical reason is the “stronger” concept: 
without its guidance, instrumental reason risks 
amounting to mere pseudo-rationality – the use 
of efficient means for the wrong ends. The 
quest for practical reason thus represents not 
just another dimension but rather a higher, 
more comprehensive level of rationality, or in 
the terms of our philosophical staircase, an 
additional discursive step that leads us further 
toward a reflective practice of ISD.  
Another interesting implication of the 
two-dimensional concept of reason is this. 
Instrumentally successful action is often 
considered to possess a higher degree of 
rationality than practical reason (interpersonal 
rightness), as it is seen to demonstrate the 
“objective” empirical validity of the 
underpinning theoretical claims. This may be 
true; but from the viewpoint of practical 
reason, a rationalization of practice that is 
guided only by instrumental reason 
nevertheless represents an utterly subjective 
form of rationality! It succumbs to a 
fundamental confusion of nontechnical 
rationality with irrationality (Ulrich 1988, pp. 
143-146). Because the underlying concept of 
rationality does not include the dimension of 
practical reason, disciplines that conceive of 
themselves in terms of applied science tend to 
reduce practical to instrumental rationality, a 
form of rationality that captures only the 
expediency of actions for attaining the chosen 
ends of those in control of actions; 
inadvertently, a merely utilitarian concept of 
practical reason is thus adopted.  
ISD and practical philosophy. As an 
applied discipline, ISD cannot help relying on 
strong normative assumptions regarding the 
nature of rational practice. What we just 
observed about the “strong” nature of practical 
reason suggests it is not sufficient for ISD to 
conceive of its rationality in terms of applied 
science. Rather, a satisfactory multi-level 
framework for ISD as we intend it with our 
staircase needs to include practical philosophy 
at its highest level of practice reflection and 
validation. Given the manifold validation 
issues that we have already identified in steps 
1-6 of the staircase, how could an applied 
discipline as difficult as ISD hope to contribute 
to socially rational practice except by 
developing a strong tradition of reflective 
practice, regarding the strong assumptions in 
question as well as the weak theoretical and 
philosophical foundations on which it can 
presently rely?  
This is indeed the question that 
motivated me to undertake the present effort of 
developing a philosophical staircase for ISD. 
The idea is not that IS professionals ought to 
become philosophers (although to a certain 
extent that might not be a bad idea!); the idea 
is, rather, that developing true competence in 
ISD is impossible without a new notion of 
professional competence in systems design, 
one that would be grounded in the quest for 
reflective practice. I think an adequate notion 
of reflective practice – defined in terms of how 
we deal with the problem of practical reason 
rather than in the “soft” terms of Schön (1983) 
– can indeed provide IS researchers and 
practitioners with a new sense of professional 
competence. At the same time I am convinced 
that a firm grounding of ISD in reflective 
practice is also vital for defining – and 
improving – the role it plays in and for civil 
society. I have dedicated two recent studies to 
these issues and found them to be closely 
interdependent: reflective practice has a lot to 
do with both, the quest for competence (Ulrich 
2001) and for a living civil society (Ulrich 
2000a).  
My question also implies that there is 
an urgent need in ISD for developing standards 
for critical reflection on practice. I believe 
practical philosophy – along with the other 
sources of reflection suggested by the 
philosophical staircase – can and should 
become a major source of such standards. In 
particular, I suggest that we refer to practical 
philosophy for deriving our concepts of 
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rational action, rather than deriving them from 
the notion of applied science and from a 
foundation in the theory of knowledge alone. 
Let us try and see. Once again, Habermas will 
be our guide. 
A typology of rational action. A 
proven method for developing analytically 
useful categorizations of complex social 
phenomena is by defining ideal types (in this 
case, of “rational” action). Ideal types need not 
be “realistic” but they should characterize in 
pure form, as it were, some crucial features (in 
the present case, kernels of rationality) that in 
reality combine to the phenomena in question 
and in terms of which we can better understand 
those phenomena. Such a categorization could 
then help us understand and examine the 
extent to which concrete actions are assuming 
different standards of rationality. The four 
basic validity claims contained in speech acts 
are such ideal types; however, they apply to 
levels 4-6 of our philosophical staircase of 
ISD. The issue now is what additional validity 
claims we should consider at the three highest 
level of staircase, levels 7-9. The point is that 
when it comes to assessing the rationality of 
actions, the four validity claims that are 
constitutive of knowledge provide a necessary 
but not a sufficient basis for claims to 
rationality; for, as Habermas makes clear, 
“rationality has less to do with the possession 
of knowledge than with how speaking and 
acting subjects acquire and use knowledge.” 
(Habermas 1984, p. 8)  
In his Theory of Communicative Action, 
Habermas (1984, p. 279-286, esp. 285) 
proposes a typology of action that can help us 
deal with this requirement. The typology is 
conceptually simple yet powerful. It provides a 
framework that I have also found practically 
relevant in my experience as a policy analyst 
and evaluation researcher in government. It 
captures fundamental differences in the 
standards of rationality that actors pursue in 
their attempts to be “rational.” What is more, it 
also does justice to the concept of practical 
reason introduced above. Building on previous 
work by the sociologist Max Weber (1978), 
Habermas suggests two basic dimensions for 
classifying actions (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Types of action according to Habermas (1984, p. 285) 
Action  
orientation 
Action 
situation 
Oriented to success Oriented to reaching 
understanding 
Nonsocial Instrumental action ———— 
Social Strategic action Communicative action 
 
Depending on whether or not 
interpersonal relationships matter, actions are 
either “social“ or “nonsocial.” Habermas calls 
this dimension the action situation; to some 
extent it mirrors Weber’s concern about the 
diminishing role of interpersonal coordination 
of actions in the “social life-world” as 
compared to the ever-increasing reach of 
impersonal coordination according to merely 
functional criteria of purposiveness and 
bureaucracy. The defining feature of social 
action situations is for Habermas that unlike in 
nonsocial situations, rational action is 
impossible without taking into account the 
actions and views of other actors. This may 
happen in different, more or less cooperative 
ways; the second dimension of the typology 
captures this issue.  
Depending on whether or not actors 
consider only their own interests or also those 
of other persons, actions are either “oriented to 
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success” or “oriented to reaching 
understanding.” Habermas calls this second 
dimension the action orientation; it reflects his 
earlier well-known distinction of two 
fundamental orientations of practice, to “work” 
or to “interaction” (Habermas 1971). 
Rationalizing these two aspects of practice 
means different things. The rationalization of 
“work” implies an expansion of technical 
control so as to ensure success, whereas the 
rationalization of “interaction” implies an 
expansion of communicative means for 
achieving mutual understanding. In the present 
context, we can capture the step from a mere 
success orientation to a concern for mutual 
understanding by the simple formula: “from 
calculation to communication.” This shift of 
orientation is distinctive of rational action as 
intended by practical reason. 
At first glance, the intent of the two 
dimensions seems to be almost the same. 
However, when we cross tabulate them as 
shown in Table 2, an important point becomes 
apparent: recognizing the social nature of an 
action situation is not the same as approaching 
it with a cooperative orientation. It may 
amount to merely strategic action, which the 
typology reveals to represent an extension of 
instrumental action to social situations rather 
than the step from calculation to 
communication (communicative action). 
Habermas explains: 
We call an action oriented to success 
instrumental when we consider it under the 
aspect of following technical rules of 
action and assess the efficiency of an 
intervention into a complex of 
circumstances and events. We call an 
action oriented to success strategic when 
we consider it under the aspect of 
following rules of rational choice and 
assess the efficacy of influencing the 
decisions of a rational opponent. 
Instrumental actions can be connected with 
and subordinated to social interactions 
[…]; strategic actions are social actions by 
themselves. By contrast, I shall speak of 
communicative action whenever the 
actions of the agents involved are 
coordinated not through egocentric 
calculations of success but through acts of 
reaching understanding. (Habermas 1984, 
p. 285f) 
Note that a teleological, purposeful 
orientation is fundamental to all three concepts 
of action. It would be a misunderstanding to 
equate communicative action with action that 
pursues no other purpose than communication 
for its own sake. Communicative action 
includes a cooperative orientation to mutual 
understanding – this distinguishes it from the 
two other concepts of action – but it does not 
exclude the pursuit of purposes. 
Communication is a means of coordinating 
individual purposeful actions rather than the 
end. The point of the classification is that 
actors may pursue purposes in different ways, 
dependent on their individual orientation as 
well as the nature of the situation.  
The discursive kernel of rational 
action. The reader may miss in this typology a 
fourth concept of action, discursive action. 
However, it should be clear from our previous 
discussion that discourse is a way of 
examining the validity claims contained in any 
of the three basic forms of purposeful action. 
For this reason it is not advisable to conceive 
of it as a separate fourth kind of action, 
although this is what a few contributors have 
suggested who have considered Habermas’ 
typology of action in the ISD literature thus 
far. When the instrumental or strategic 
rationality of a course of action is in doubt, 
actors can switch to theoretical discourse; 
when its communicative rationality is in 
question, they can switch to practical 
discourse. Conversely, when the legitimacy of 
merely instrumental or strategic action as such 
is contested, actors may subject it to a practical 
discourse; and when the technical or economic 
feasibility of some communicatively defined 
action is in doubt, theoretical discourse may be 
indicated. (Bear in mind that all action implies 
both empirical and normative validity claims, 
regardless of the orientation that effectively 
guides the actors involved). The point thus is 
simply that any kind of purposeful action 
offers itself for discursive scrutiny. This is why 
“discursive action” does not exist as a separate 
category in Habermas’ typology. 
Returning now to our staircase, the 
same point applies: no single step but rather 
the staircase as a whole embodies the 
discursive principle. It makes sense, however, 
to conceive of instrumental, strategic and 
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communicative action as three ideal types of 
rationality that come into play at the highest 
three levels of the staircase and as such may 
require discursive scrutiny in any concrete case 
of IS design. We can understand the three 
concepts of action as representing not only 
three complementary dimensions of systems 
rationalization but also a natural hierarchy in 
which each level presupposes the previous 
ones. Table 3 shows this three-level model of 
rational systems practice, a model that I have 
introduced in more detail elsewhere  (Ulrich 
1988). 
 
Table 3: Three-level concept of rational systems practice (adapted from Ulrich 1988) 
Dimension of 
systems 
rationalization  
 
Core problem Level of systems practice Tradition of 
systems thinking 
Communicative  Management of conflict 
Social integration of 
conflicting interests 
 
Normative systems 
management  
Building up potentials of 
mutual understanding 
(interactive capabilities and 
discursive chances) 
“Critical” 
 
Strategic  Management of 
complexity 
Effective steering of 
complex systems  
 
Strategic systems 
management  
Building up strategic 
potentials of success 
(steering capacities in view 
of uncertainty and change) 
“Soft” 
Instrumental  Management of cost  
Efficient allocation of 
scarce resources 
 
Operational systems 
management  
Building up potentials of 
productivity (optimization) 
“Hard” 
 
The level of operational systems 
management stands for a nonsocial, 
instrumental concept of rationality. It is 
concerned with the efficient use of means 
rather than with developing interpersonal 
relationships. Rationality at this level is 
defined and measured in terms of means-end 
rationality, that is, purposiveness (also called 
purposive-rationality). We conceptualize it as 
the lowest of the three levels because none of 
the higher levels can fulfill its promise of 
further rationalizing practice before the 
problems of this lowest level are mastered. 
The level of strategic systems 
management stands for a social yet utilitarian 
concept of rationality. Its orientation remains 
purposive-rational even though interpersonal 
relationships and intentions of other actors are 
taken into account. Strategic management is 
concerned with the complexity and uncertainty 
that is characteristic of social action situations 
in which third parties co-produce the system’s 
success (or may threaten it). Under such 
circumstances, the immediate orientation to 
results that distinguishes the previous level 
needs to be complemented by a longer-term 
concern for securing “strategic potentials of 
success,” that is, capabilities of self-regulation, 
flexibility, and innovative adaptation in the 
face of turbulent environments (Emery and 
Trist 1965) and changing needs of all the 
parties concerned. 
The level of communicative systems 
management, finally, stands for a social and 
communicative concept of rationality. It is 
concerned with the normative implications of 
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purposive rationality as represented by both 
instrumentally and strategically rational action. 
In particular, it examines the ways in which 
purposive-rational action may affect third 
parties and how “rational” its rationality claims 
may look from their perspective. What does it 
mean to be rational when there is a genuine 
conflict of rationalities, due to different needs 
and interests, values and worldviews? Rather 
than simply imposing its own rationality on 
other parties and thereby treating them as mere 
means for the pursuit of its own success, 
systems rationalization at this level seeks to 
achieve mutual understanding with respect to 
the normative basis of rational action. It 
overcomes the limitations of a merely strategic 
handling of conflicts of interests by a concern 
for normative acceptability and rationality in 
the comprehensive sense intended by the 
concept of practical reason.  
Practical reason aims to expand the 
reach of rationality from purposive-rationality 
to the interactive dimension that is constitutive 
of normative (evaluative) issues. To this end, it 
strives to coordinate individual actions not 
only based on interest positions alone but on 
agreement concerning guiding standards of 
value as well. Of course such agreement can 
claim rationality only to the extent that it 
withstands discursive challenge by all those 
concerned; but the same limitation is basically 
true of all other conditions of purposeful action 
as conceptualized in the staircase.  
The importance of this level of systems 
rationalization is not merely that the interactive 
dimension of rational practice is different but 
first of all, that it exists and should not be 
ignored. As we have seen in our brief 
discussion of the concept of applied science, 
this is by no means obvious. This highest step 
in the staircase should remind us, in every 
concrete case, that we may need to examine 
carefully whether and in what ways we might 
succumb to the earlier-mentioned confusion of 
nontechnical rationality with nonrationality, 
according to which “rational” is only what can 
be explained in the terms of empirical-analytic 
science. By implication practice would be 
rational only to the extent that practical 
decisions can be reduced to theoretical issues – 
a conception of practical rationality that in 
effect immunizes utilitarian rationality against 
the efforts of practical reason. I find it difficult 
indeed to see why introducing a 
complementary level of communicative 
rationalization should imply a loss rather than 
a gain of practical rationality; as soon as one 
does not limit rationality a priori (merely by 
definition) to technical rationality, this highest 
level of our staircase becomes an indispensable 
effort of critical reflection and discourse in the 
quest for rational practice.  
5 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION 
Uncovering the hidden 
argumentative structure of information 
systems. We have now completed the 
introduction of the philosophical staircase. As 
I have attempted to make clear, its nine steps 
all stand for considerations that are as vital 
practically as they are philosophically 
indispensable for ISD, and in fact for all 
systems design. I have equally tried to make 
clear that for each step, the discursive principle 
is constitutive for justifying or questioning the 
validity claims involved. Since each step 
represents an additional level of systems 
rationalization, it also implies additional 
assumptions and corresponding claims that 
need to be open to argumentative challenge, 
which is what discourse is all about. This 
suggests to me a first, basic interpretation of 
our staircase: 
The philosophical staircase embodies a 
summary account of the relevance and 
application of the discursive principle 
 to ISD. 
By arranging the issues to which it 
points in a theoretically based hierarchical 
order, the staircase offers a systematic 
(although iterative) way of proceeding. To the 
extent it achieves its purpose it can guide IS 
designers and users alike in reflecting upon, 
and discussing, the concepts of “information,“ 
of “knowledge,” and of ”rational” action that 
are, or ought to be, built into a system:  
Steps 1-3 represent the philosophically 
unavoidable assumptions and validity 
claims underpinning a specific 
information system’s built-in concept of 
information. 
• 
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Steps 4-6 represent the additional 
assumptions and validity claims that come 
into play if the information provided by 
the specific system is to be considered as 
representing a knowledge basis for 
decision-making and action. 
• 
• Steps 7-9, finally, represent the additional 
assumptions and validity claims that need 
to be addressed if such action is to be 
conducive to rational practice. 
An interesting implication is this. Since 
discursive reality is never ideal, we can 
understand the assumptions that flow into a 
specific IS design as representing the break-off 
points of discourses that have been terminated 
implicitly or explicitly at some point of 
reflection by those involved. Their 
assumptions concerning the nine steps thus 
represent the hidden argumentative structure of 
the specific information system in question. 
This conjecture yields a second interpretation 
of the staircase:  
The nine conceptual steps of the staircase 
also embody the hidden argumentative 
structure that in one way or another is 
built into any information system.  
As an example we may consider once 
again a hospital information systems. Such 
systems basically serve to control the huge 
flow of data that is necessary for treating and 
billing patients as well as for administrating 
the diverse organizational units of a hospital. 
More recently, the trend goes toward so-called 
case-mix measurement. “Case mix” is a 
hospital unit’s specific mix of patients with 
regard to their treatments needs, that is, the 
severity and complexity of their conditions. 
The idea is that performance and cost 
measurements cannot be meaningfully 
compared among different organizational units 
and used for improving the effectiveness and 
efficiency of hospitals unless they are 
standardized with respect to the changing case 
mix of the units considered. The most widely 
used system of case-mix measurement today is 
Yale University’s “diagnosis-related groups” 
(DRG) system (Fetter et al. 1980; for a 
comprehensive hospital indicator system based 
on case-mix and service-population 
measurement see Ulrich 1987b, 1990). In 
many countries the financing arrangements for 
hospitals now depend on such systems, that is, 
case-mix measurement is linked to rewards 
and sanctions that can be vital for the financial 
viability and the development of hospitals. The 
specific case-mix based indicator system used 
thus represents an important (and complex) 
part of the hidden argumentative structure of 
these hospital information systems. The 
question is, how well does this argumentative 
structure reflect the medical needs of patients, 
the quality and efficiency of the care they 
receive, regional needs for the provision of 
hospital services, the contribution of hospitals 
to the training of doctors and nurses, and so 
on? Who knows what is the “right” 
argumentative structure? How can medical 
staff and administrators act responsibly 
without being in a position to question and 
modify this argumentative structure? To what 
extent, then, should the system be relied on as 
a source of relevant information and valid 
knowledge for rational action in hospitals, 
given its power to sanction hospital units for 
not acting according to its measurements?  
Surely it would make sense 
systematically to subject the information 
provided by this kind of hospital IS to 
institutionalized discursive procedures in 
which all concerned parties participate in the 
examination of case-mix measures and other 
parts of the system’s argumentative structure 
with regard to its semiotic clarity, the 
empirical and normative validity of the 
conclusions derived, and the rationality of 
conforming action proposals. I assume that 
some formal procedures of this kind exist in 
most hospitals and financial authorities, but I 
doubt whether those involved are all in a very 
good position to assess the claims in question. 
A good system might improve the situation by 
offering methodical help in identifying and 
judging the underpinning argumentative 
structure. I am thinking, for example, of 
interactive system capabilities that would 
highlight the specific inference structure 
underpinning any considered hospital indicator 
and allow everyone involved making their own 
“sensitivity tests” as to how results depend on 
the structure (and of course also on the data). 
The system might also offer relevant questions 
for interpreting the result obtained, perhaps 
even along the lines of our staircase. The aim 
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would be to put all the parties concerned in a 
position in which they can meaningfully 
interpret the system’s informationIT and then 
use discursive opportunities, whether 
institutionalized or informal ones, to support or 
challenge proposals for actions in a competent 
and responsible way. I cannot pursue the 
example here any further, but I think it does 
illustrate the suggested, twofold interpretation 
of the philosophical staircase and thus also the 
practical importance of the discursive 
principle.  
In Part 2, we will review the way in 
which the discursive principle has been 
considered thus far in the ISD literature. 
Subsequently, I will outline my own discursive 
approach to reflective practice in ISD. 
(References: see Part 2) 
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